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CuRB YOUR ECOTERRORISM: IDENTIFYING THE
NEXUs BETWEEN STATE CRIMINALIZATION OF
ECOTERROR AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
POLICY
PAUL J. KARASICK*
INTRODUCTION
If you find yourself unhappy with the environmental state of affairs
in your state, how do you respond? Write to your local congressman?
Picket with some signs? Commit acts of destruction to coerce others to
cease acting on the environment? The rising prevalence of the latter choice
of action1 by extremist environmental groups has contributed to their
being classified as one of the most serious domestic threats to the United
States.2 While most environmental groups are no stranger to activism
like dissemination of information and protest, extremist groups, often
called "ecoterrorists," in the name of environmental activism, may resort
to violence or, more often, destruction of property.3 To combat this, legis-
lators have increasingly focused on legislation specifically targeted at the
so-called "ecoterrorist."4 In June of 2006, Pennsylvania enacted just such
an ecoterror statute.5 The statute makes it a crime to commit certain
offenses against property with the intent to either intimidate, coerce, pre-
vent, or obstruct individuals engaged in plant or natural resource activities
or facilities.6
* J.D. candidate, William & Mary School of Law, Class of 2009.
'Acts of destruction attributed to ecoterror have occurred as recently as March.of 2008.
William Yardley, Ecoterrorism Suspected in House Fires in Seattle Suburb, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/us/O4homes.html?scp=
1&sq=ecoterrorism&st=nyt.
2 Oversight on Eco-terrorism Specifically Examining the Earth Liberation Front ("ELF")
and the Animal Liberation Front ("ALF") Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment
& Public Works, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at http:epw.senate.gov/hearing-statement
.cfm?id=237817.
' Joshua K Marquis & Danielle M. Weiss, Eco-Terror: Special Interest Terrorism,
PROSECUTOR, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 30.
4 See, e.g., Alyson B. Walker, A Field of Failed Dreams: Problems Passing Effective
Ecoterrorism Legislation, 18 VRL. ENVTL. L.J. 99 (2007).
5 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3311 (Supp. 2008).
6 Id.
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Ecoterror could largely be seen as the extreme opposite end of the
environmentalist perspective from environmental legislation. Environ-
mental law forces those acting on the environment to conform their actions
to a governmentally dictated pattern of behavior.' Ecoterror seeks to do
the same, but instead of using the legitimate avenue of legislative change,
it seeks to coerce through the illegitimate means of fear and destruc-
tion.' Because ecoterror legislation seeks to differentiate between those
using coercive means to accomplish anything else and those using coercive
means to target the same groups who would be bound by environmental
law,9 ecoterror legislation and environmental law must naturally inter-
twine. Ideally, ecoterror legislation that accomplishes what it sets out to
do, namely deter eco-terrorist activity, should then consequently encour-
age activists to seek legitimate means for their environmental ends. °
Similarly, if environmental law accomplishes what it sets out to do,
namely protect the environment from those who would affect it, this too
should encourage activists to seek legitimate means for their environmen-
tal ends. Successful ecoterror legislation should take into account envi-
ronmental law, and the potential in environmental law.
This Note will first look broadly at what ecoterror is, including
how it is defined by both academia and the laws that seek to fight it. Next,
the Note will look at ecoterror activity from the perspective of the eco-
terrorist and the ideology and motivation behind ecoterror activity. The
Note will then look at the various ways in which state and federal laws
choose to fight ecoterror activity, including a specific in-depth look at the
'See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) ("A primary goal of this chapter is to encourage
or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions, consistent
with the provisions of this chapter, for pollution prevention.").
8 Marquis & Weiss, supra note 3, at 31.
'See Dara Lovitz, Animal Lovers and Tree Huggers are the New Cold-Blooded Criminals?:
Examining the Flaws of Ecoterrorism Bills, 3 J. ANIMAL L. 79, 95-96 (2007). The author
discusses ecoterror legislation from the similar animal activist perspective, saying, "It is the
viewpoint of the animal rights activist that is being punished .... What is otherwise
considered a simple theft rises to the level of terrorist activity when the alleged perpetrator
is furthering an animal rights cause." Id.; see also Ben Saul, Three Reasons for Defining
and Criminalizing Terrorism, Florence Founding Conference Paper, European Society
of International Law 1 (2004), available at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/fichiers/en/Saul_625
.pdf(recognizing in the broader context of international terrorism, that because most acts
of terror consist of acts already punishable as criminal offenses, there should be a specific
rationale for criminalizing terrorism specifically or it should serve some further interest).
'o See Saul, supra note 9, at 8-9 (arguing that one reason for criminalizing terrorism is
that terrorism undermines democratic values like political participation, as it "replaces
politics with violence, and dialogue with terror").
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Pennsylvania and Colorado examples. Then, this Note will discuss the
ways in which state ecoterror law should be informed by state environ-
mental protection policy. The Note will finally look at the appropriateness
of Pennsylvania's and Colorado's ecoterror policies in light of their respec-
tive environmental protection policies.
I. WHAT IS ECOTERROR?
A. Defining Ecoterror
Ecoterror is a concept that is hard to define concretely, as it has
as many definitions as there are parties with an interest in the concept."
Defining ecoterror has deep implications for individual states and the
public at large, particularly when it comes to combating ecoterror. For
example, states wishing to combat ecoterror may try to define ecoterror
as drawing in as wide a range of activity as possible. 2 The proposed Stop
Terrorism Property Act of 2003, for example, defined the crime of ecoterror
as implicating anyone who "intentionally damages the property of another
with the intent to influence the public with regard to conduct the offender
considers harmful to the environment." 3 The FBI defines ecoterror as "the
use or threatened use of violence against innocent victims or property for
environmental-political reasons often aimed at an audience beyond the
target, often of a symbolic nature.""
Some disagree with a broad definition of ecoterror, fearing that
broadly defining ecoterror may include legitimate activity and attach to
that activity the stigma of being labeled "terrorism."15 Labeling legitimate
" Lovitz, supra note 9, at 80; Walker, supra note 4, at 102-03; see also Marquis & Weiss,
supra note 3, at 30 (providing an example of ecoterror being defined by one such party-
prosecutors).
2 Chrystal Mancuso-Smith, From Monkeywrenching to Mass Destruction: Eco-Sabotage
and the American West, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 319, 320 (2006) ("R] ather
than providing specific guidance, lawmakers seem to prefer overly broad generalizations
that would encompass a wide range of activities.").
1 See Stop Terrorism Property Act of 2003, quoted in Walker, supra note 4, at 100-01. It
is interesting to note how similar this definition is to the stated objective of the Earth
Liberation Front ("ELF"), an organization commonly referred to as an ecoterrorist
organization, which is to "'inflict economic damage on those profitting [sic] from the de-
struction and exploitation of the natural environment .... '"Denise R. Case, The USA
Patriot Act: Adding Bite to the Fight Against Animal Rights Terrorism?, 34 RUTGERS L.J.
187 (2002) (quoting ELF website).
14 Marquis & Weiss, supra note 3, at 30; Lovitz, supra note 9, at 80.
15 18 PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY LEG. J. 341, 382 (Mar. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. Leach)
("[Wie do not call peaceful protestors terrorists... I think we are insulting the people
2009]
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activity as "terrorism" could have the unfortunate consequence of chilling
free speech, as many would choose not to engage in free speech activity,
rather than risk being labeled a terrorist. 6 Others also take issue with
the unduly inflammatory connotation of the word "terrorist," especially
in light of the contemporary political landscape. 7 Generally speaking,
"ecoterror" involves the use of fear-inducing coercive tactics to the end
of either protecting the environment or influencing those who may be
affecting the environment to protect the environment (or at least cease
affecting the environment).'"
who have been victims of terrorism by calling this terrorism."); see also Testimony in
Opposition to HB 213 Before the Pennsylvania State Judiciary Committee (June 6, 2005)
(statement by the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania) ("Classifying people
who trespass or engage in disorderly conduct as terrorists is unwarranted .... It is a
coercive tactic that one would not expect in a society that not only considers itself free
but also holds itself out as a model for other societies."), available at
http://www.aclupa.orgllegislation/ pastsessions/ecoterrorismbillhb2l3testi.htm.
6 See Lovitz, supra note 9, at 91-93 (citing a Supreme Court case on the First Amendment
for the principle that "'[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider
of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked.'") (citation omitted); Pennsylvania Sierra Club, Legislation Criminalizes Environ-
mental Activism in "Ecoterrorism" Bill, http://pennsylvania.sierraclub.org/PAChapter
.old/Issues/Ecoterrorism.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008); Patti Bednarik, What the General
Practitioner Needs to Know About Pennsylvania Animal Law: The Evolving Field of
Animal Law, 77 PA. B. ASS'N. Q. 88, 92 (2006).
The potential for the chilling of free speech activity is one aspect of ecoterror
legislation that has received criticism for raising First Amendment concerns. Walker, supra
note 4, at 112. Other First Amendment concerns have been raised as a result of ecoterror
law that focuses on an offender's intent to influence, and viewpoint-based discrimination.
For examples of such criticism see id. at 109-12; Lovitz, supra note 9, at 94-96. See also
Jared S. Goodman, Shielding Corporate Interests From Public Dissent: An Examination
of the Undesirability and Unconstitutionality of "Eco-Terrorism" Legislation, 16 J.L. &
POL'Y 823, 825-26 (2008) (arguing "animal terrorism legislation" may undesirably draw
in nonviolent activism and encroaches on free speech rights).
17 Lovitz, supra note 9, at 88; see also Rebecca K Smith, "Ecoterrorism"?:A CriticalAnalysis
of the Vilification of Radical Environmental Activists as Terrorists, 38 ENVTL. L. 537, 537
(2008) (arguing that the use of the term "ecoterrorism" to describe radical environmen-
talists "diminishes the true meaning of the word terrorism, stifles political dissent," and
pretextually protects private economic gains at the expense of environmental protection).
But see Mancuso-Smith, supra note 12, at 323 (arguing that labeling such activity as
"terror" gives it more attention and actually enhances its effectiveness and prevalence).
While recognizing the arguments for and against use of the term "ecoterror," and
while recognizing proposed substitutions, see id., this Note will use the term "ecoterror"
for the sake of consistency and to maintain continuity with most of the existing literature.
1 8 Walker supra note 4, at 104 (quoting the National Conference of State Legislatures,
defining ecoterrorism as "'any crime committed in the name of saving nature'... [using]
fear as the primary motivator to change public policy and/or people's behavior").
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B. Ecoterror's Goals
Laws that punish or prevent ecoterror activity specifically draw
a distinction between activity done for "ecoterror" purposes, namely to
coerce actors on the environment, and the same activity done for any
other purpose.' 9 It stands to reason, then, that the ideology of ecoterror
has important ramifications for defining what ecoterror is, and thus how
to combat it. 20 Ecoterror's foremost goal is the preservation of the envi-
ronment. 21 What makes ecoterror distinctive from normal environmen-
talism is the belief in doing "whatever they consider necessary to disrupt
any activity or project that they determine is detrimental or a threat to the
environment."22 More specifically, ecoterror intends that through fear and
economic damage, environmental "violators" will cease their behavior.23
This is most salient in the ELF example. The Earth Liberation
Front began as a splinter group of members of the environmental organi-
zation Earth First!, who became disillusioned with Earth First!'s refusal
to resort to criminal tactics for environmental preservation. 24 At first, the
radical splinter group aimed to somehow give the mainstream environ-
mental organizations more leverage in negotiating environmental protec-
tionism with the government.25 Over time, they have abandoned such a
9 Lovitz, supra note 9, at 95-96. As mentioned briefly supra note 16, this distinction has
raised some First Amendment concerns.20 See Saul, supra note 9, at 1 (arguing that successful criminalization of terrorism requires
formulating a concrete definition).21 Walker, supra note 4, at 100 ("[E]xtremist environmental groups... want to free Earth
of human interference-interference that any civilian could cause.").
22 Marquis & Weiss, supra note 3, at 32.
23 Mancuso-Smith, supra note 12, at 322.
14 Marquis & Weiss, supra note 3, at 31. The ELF is considered one of the more, if not most,
pronounced ecoterror organizations, and discussions of ecoterror ideology often look to
the ELF as exemplary. The Marquis & Weiss article treats the ELF and "environmental
extremists" as nearly interchangeable. The ELF's noted goals are "to inflict economic dam-
age on those profiting from the destruction and exploitation of the natural environment...
to reveal and educate the public on the atrocities committed against the Earth and all
species that populate it... [and] to take all necessary precautions against harming any
animal, human, and non-human."Id. (citation omitted). Because these noted goals coalesce
with the common definitions of ecoterror organizations, their goals will be similarly treated
as exemplary of the ultimate goals of ecoterror more generally.
It should also be noted that the ELF has no official membership, treating itself
more as a "philosophy" than an organization, and considers anyone committing ecoterror
who espouses themself as a member of ELF to be a member. See Xavier Beltran, Applying
RICO to Eco-Activism: Fanning the Radical Flames of Eco-Terror, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 281, 302-03 (2002).
25 Beltran, supra note 24, at 302.
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goal, instead acting "as though the mainstream no longer exists and
they, the eco-activists, are the only ones left to carry on the struggle."26
Some argue, that beyond disruption of environment-affecting activ-
ity, ecoterror serves, in an extreme form, to bring attention and publicity
to the environmental cause."
Thus, while ecoterrorists have the ultimate goal of environmental
protection, their means have deliberately rejected legitimate political or
social action, going so far as to resort to criminal activity to bring attention
to their cause.28 This has important consequences for states' environmental
protection policies. Because ecoterrorists are ultimately seeking to protect
the environment, if a state offers a high degree of environmental protec-
tion, it makes ecoterror activity that much more illegitimate, and would
further justify the state's decision to have criminal statutes that specifi-
cally seek to counter ecoterror activity.29
II. RESPONSES TO ECOTERROR
A. Fighting Ecoterror
There are numerous approaches to fighting ecoterror.3 ° Because
ecoterror is a relatively new phenomenon and ecoterrorists have remained
elusive, there is not much hard data suggesting that any one particular
method appropriately curbs ecoterror activity.
Often, states will treat what is considered "ecoterror" the same
as any other crime, seeking prosecution under existing criminal statutes
like arson and destruction of property.3' This approach avoids the First
26 Id. at 302, 304.
27 Marquis & Weiss, supra note 3, at 32 (referencing the ELF attack on a Vail, Colorado,
ski resort, which attracted a lot of attention for many reasons, not the least of which was
the $12 million in damages caused by the attack, but was unsuccessful in any of its environ-
mental goals). See also Yardley, supra note 1 (reporting recent fires set to a Seattle housing
development marketed as "green," but receiving criticism for its impact on local wetlands,
prompting one observer to comment that the fires were "releasing more carbon into the
air than they ever would have by building the houses"); Mancuso-Smith, supra note 12,
at 322 (arguing that attaining the "terror" label actually aids in the goal of bringing
attention to its cause).28 See supra Part I.B.
' See infra Part III.30 See Mancuso-Smith, supra note 12, at 325-36.
31 Marquis & Weiss, supra note 3, at 35 ("Eco-terrorists need to know that when the line
between a legitimate protest and criminal act is crossed, even if only a misdemeanor, the
prosecutors of America will react. You do not need an exotic anti-terror law to charge a
586 [Vol. 33:581
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Amendment issues raised by the potential for ecoterror legislation to focus
on intent, and also avoids both the inflammatory "terror" label and the
risk of giving ecoterrorists empowering attention.32
Some acts of ecoterror have been prosecuted under federal criminal
law,33 sometimes using the organizational aspect of ecoterror groups to
fold prosecution under RICO laws.34 Without concern for environmental
extremists having an economic motive,35 RICO could be applied to eco-
terror in any situation where an organization is shown to have engaged
in some enterprise affecting interstate commerce.36 While this approach
would provide both criminal penalties and payment of damages to entities
affected by ecoterror, concerns have been lodged that organizational lia-
bility will, instead of discouraging ecoterror, act to encourage it.37 Because
ecoterror groups, such as ELF, exist organizationally only loosely, open
environmental groups may face organizational liability, driving protesters
to seek the less risky, underground extremist environmental groups as the
only effective means of environmental protest.38
Some have also advocated expanding use of Patriot Act paradigms
in use against ecoterror.39 Recently, this has taken the form of the model
Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act ("AETA). 4° The model AETAparallels
terrorist; eco-terrorists can be punished within the parameters of any existing laws, such
as arson or destruction of property.").
31 See Mancuso-Smith, supra note 12, at 322.
' Walker, supra note 4, at 113-15; see also infra Part II.C. (discussing one high profile
act of ecoterror that was prosecuted under federal criminal law). See generally Walker,
supra note 4, at 105-07 (discussing two proposed federal ecoterror laws, the Stop Terrorism
Property Act of 2003, and the Ecoterrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which sought to modify
the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 by including protection for plant enterprises
in addition to the already protected animal enterprises).
' See Beltran, supra note 24; Donna E. Correll, No Peace for the Greens: The Criminal
Prosecution of Environmental Activists and the Threat of Organizational Liability, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 773, 802-04 (1993).
3 Beltran, supra note 24, at 285.
36 See Correll, supra note 34, at 802-04.37 See Beltran, supra note 24, at 308 ("Triple monetary damages mean little or nothing
to an individual or small group of individuals who decide to set fire to a $12 million ski
lodge. It is safe to presume that such individuals are largely aware they risk everything
for their extreme actions and, accordingly, will hedge liability by going deeper under-
ground. The threat of RICO, however, places a choke-hold on an open, above ground, and
otherwise legal protest organization.").
Id. at 307-09.
3 See, e.g., Case, supra note 13; Ethan Carson Eddy, Privatizing the Patriot Act: The
Criminalization ofEnvironmental and Animal Protectionists as Terrorists, 22 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 261 (2005).
'o Eddy, supra note 39, at 262.
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the Patriot Act's format for organizational liability by proscribing the pro-
vision of "material support" to so-called terror organizations. 4 Criticism
of the model AETA has focused on its criminalization of both destructive
acts deterring, obstructing, coercing, influencing, or impeding the busi-
ness activities of environmental actors, as well as acts more closely thought
of as protected speech activity doing the same.42 Because organizational
liability for providing material support does not require intent or specific
knowledge to contribute to ecoterror activity, some may choose not to sup-
port any environmental organizations at all, rather than risk being tied
to an ecoterror organization.43 Despite these potential misgivings, sev-
eral states have proposed adopting the model AETA in whole or in altered
form,' while addressing some of the concerns to varying degrees.45
State ecoterror laws have taken various other forms.46 Some states
proscribe particular activity fitting statutory definitions of "ecoterror"
activity. Subtly different, other states may provide penalty enhancements
for crimes committed with statutorily-defined ecoterror purposes. Some
states also enhance civil penalties for ecoterror actors, which include giv-
ing ecoterror victims liability recourse or removing statutes of limitations
on recovery.
B. Pennsylvania's Ecoterror Statute
1. 18 Pa.C.S. 3311
One salient ecoterror measure is that of Pennsylvania, which was
signed into law April 14, 2006.17 While some states combat ecoterror activ-
ity without actually invoking the term "ecoterror," Pennsylvania's statute
is notable because it provides for the specific offense of "ecoterrorism.""
The Pennsylvania statute is specifically a property destruction statute,
proscribing the committing of certain enumerated offenses against prop-
erty for specific purposes. These purposes include an intent to "intimidate
or coerce an individual lawfully" engaged in an activity involving animals,
41 Id. at 272.42 Id. at 263-64.
4Id. at 272.
"Id. at 262.
45 Id. at 270-72.
"Lovitz, supra note 9, at 84.
47 Press Release, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Signs Ecoterrorism Bill into
Law (April 14, 2006).
48 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3311 (Supp. 2008).
588 [Vol. 33:581
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plants, or natural resources or using an animal, plant, or natural resource
facility or "prevent or obstruct an individual from lawfully" engaging in
such activities.49
Under the statute, those enumerated offenses against property
include the following: arson, causing or risking catastrophe, criminal mis-
chief, institutional or agricultural vandalism, agricultural crop destruc-
tion, burglary (only if committed for the purpose of committing another
of the enumerated offenses), criminal trespass (only if committed "for the
purpose of threatening or terrorizing the owner or occupant of the pre-
mises," starting or causing a fire on the premises, or defacing or damaging
the premises), theft, forgery, and identity theft.5 °
A person convicted under the Pennsylvania statute faces a one
degree increase in penalty for that enumerated offense committed, and
those committing first degree felonies face up to forty years imprisonment
and a potential fine of up to $100,000.5' Further, if convicted, a person can
face civil liability for the extent of the damage caused, in an amount up to
triple the value of the damaged property, including damages for research,
replacement, and development costs.52
One notable feature of the Pennsylvania statute is that it includes
immunity from both criminal and civil liability for peaceful demonstration
or peaceable pursuance of free speech rights on public property or with
permission of the landowner,53 which could be seen as the Pennsylvania
legislature's attempt to address some of the First Amendment concerns
that have been lodged at legislation specifically aimed at ecoterror.54
49 Id. § 3311(a).
50 Id. § 3311(d).
51 Id. § 3311(b).
52 Id. § 3311(c).
53 Id. § 3311(c.1) ("A person who exercises the right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the Constitution of Pennsylvania on public property or with
the permission of the landowner where the person is peaceably demonstrating or peaceably
pursuing his constitutional rights shall be immune from prosecution for these actions under
this section .... ."). See also Mancuso-Smith, supra note 12, at 334; Lovitz, supra note 9,
at 86; Bednarik, supra note 16, at 92. Despite this carve-out for free speech concerns,
some criticized the statute as still being too broad, allowing for arbitrary enforcement.
For an example of such criticism, see Testimony in Opposition to HB 213, supra note 15
(statement by the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania).
' See Press Release, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra note 47 (quoting Governor
Edward G. Rendell) ("This bill strikes the appropriate balance between protecting the
safety of our citizens and their property with one of the most important American
freedoms-the right to protest.").
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2. Pennsylvania's Purpose in Creating an Ecoterror Statute
The Pennsylvania legislature must have recognized a particular
need for having a criminal statute aimed specifically at ecoterror.55 When
proposed, Pennsylvania legislators cited concerns with the growing threat
of ecoterror.56 Upon signing the bill into the law, the governor of Pennsyl-
vania expressed similar sentiments." Representative Godshall and Gover-
nor Rendell's statements looked prospectively at the threat of ecoterror to
the state, and take on special significance in light of destruction attributed
to ecoterror which had already occurred in the state.5" Prior to the pro-
posal of the ecoterror statute, the ELF took responsibility for an estimated
$500,000 worth of damage inflicted on a highway project in March of
2002,"9 an estimated $700,000 worth of damage inflicted on a Forest
Service laboratory, which included the loss of over seventy years of re-
search related to forest ecosystem maintenance in the Allegheny region,6 °
and the destruction of $96,000 worth of sport-utility vehicles in January
of 2003.61 The governor and legislators both expressed concern that this
widespread destruction could discourage industry actors, resulting in tolls
on the state's economy and hindering important scientific research.62
55 Id.
56Government Watch, HB 213 Passes PA House: Now in the Senate Judiciary Committee,
PENNSYLVANIA BIO WATCH, May 5, 2005, available at http://www.pennsylvaniabio.org/
BIOWATCH/April2005/govwatch.htm (quoting Representative Robert Godshall, who pro-
posed the original bill) ("The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified domestic ter-
rorism as a growing threat nationwide, and ecoterrorism is a big part of that threat'....
'Mhis law will help us fight back by giving our law enforcement officers the tools they need
[to] prosecute these types of terrorists.'").
5 Press Release, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra note 47 (quoting Governor Edward
G. Rendell as saying the "increasing number of costly and dangerous acts of destruction
of property... in the name of animal rights or environmental protection" puts "the lives
of innocent law-abiding citizens at risk").
' Audrey Hudson, ELFAdmits to Arson, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002; Julian Walker, Eco-
terrorists hit Northeast Philly, NORTHEAST TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003; Intelligence Report, Eco-
Violence: The Record, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (2002), http'J/www.splcenter.org/
intel/intelreport/article.jsp?sid=29.
s Intelligence Report, supra note 58.
0 Hudson, supra note 58. This incident was specifically cited by Representative Godshall
as inspiring support for the statute. Robert B. Swift, Unusual Coalition Backs Ecoterrorism
Legislation, POCONO RECORD, Apr. 12, 2006.61 Walker, supra note 58.
6 2Government Watch, supra note 56 (quoting Representative Robert Godshall) ("My bill will
go a long way toward providing some much-needed protection for farms and research
facilities, which are important economic assets for our Commonwealth .... With more than
34,600 workers employed in the pharmaceutical and bio tech fields statewide, it's high time
we get a law on the books to deal with ecoterrorism."); Press Release, Commonwealth of
590 [Vol. 33:581
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While the general idea remained the same, the Pennsylvania statute
is strikingly different from its proposed form in 2005.' The proposed bill
specifically defined ecoterrorism,' instead of criminalizing enumerated
offenses done for enumerated purposes, as is the case in the final, codified
statute.65 The shift to using Pennsylvania's existing criminal framework
was clearly contemplated.' When signing the bill into law, the governor
recognized a particular need for an ecoterror criminalization beyond that
offered by existing criminal statutes, saying, 'The specified offenses against
property are already crimes in Pennsylvania. The purpose of this legisla-
tion, however, is to deter politically motivated property destruction with the
intent of intimidation."7 Because House Bill 213 set forth the elements of
the ecoterror crime without reference to other offenses, it also provided its
own penalty grading," rather than acting as a sentencing enhancement as
in the final statutory form.69 From a theoretical point of view, Pennsylva-
nia's shift from a defined ecoterror offense to enumerated offenses for
enumerated purposes could be seen as shifting the focus from the illegiti-
macy of the specific act involved to the illegitimacy of the motivation behind
the act.7" This will have important consequences later relating to the deci-
sion to proscribe ecoterror activity to the state's environmental policy.7'
C. The Colorado Example
Colorado is one state which lacks a specific ecoterror statute.72 While
Colorado has a specific statute aimed at curbing damage to agricultural
products, it does not extend to the property of all agricultural actors, nor
does it discuss the degree to which any tampering or damage is done for
a specific purpose.73 The statute makes anyone who, without consent of
Pennsylvania, supra note 47 ("Most of these protests are lodged against pharmaceutical and
other companies that are in the business of developing new medicines to provide treatments
and cures for deadly diseases."); Swift, supra note 60 (quoting Representative Tina Pickett)
('The bill is necessary to protect the economic livelihood of Pennsylvania's farm industry.").
6 H.B. 213, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005).6 4 id.
65 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3311(a) (Supp. 2008).
' Press Release, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra note 47.67 Id.
6 H.B. 213, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005).
69 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3311(b).
7 0 See supra note 9.
71 See infra Part III.
72 Lovitz, supra note 9, at 84.
73 COLO. REv. STAT. 35-31-201 (2002).
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the owner of the agricultural product, exercises control with an intent to
deprive or maliciously damage or destroy the agricultural product liable
for damages. ' a Liability also extends to one who encourages or conspires
with another to do so." To be sure, the Colorado statute provides for civil
damages, but does not extend criminal liability to one who acts against
the proscribed conduct in the statute.
Colorado's lack of a specific criminal ecoterror statute is remark-
able in light of acts of destruction committed in Colorado attributed to
ecoterror.76 In October of 1998, the ELF claimed responsibility for over $12
million worth of damage inflicted on a Vail, Colorado, ski resort." Eleven
people were indicted under federal criminal law in Oregon for ecoterror
acts including those on the Vail ski resort in January of 2006.7" In May of
2006, four more sets of federal indictments were brought by the Colorado
United States Attorney in connection with the Vail fires.79 The ELF also
claimed responsibility for more than two million dollars worth of damage
inflicted on a mansion in Boulder, Colorado, in November 2000.0
As demonstrated by the indictments against the ELF members for
the destruction of the Vail ski resort, federal prosecution is always an
option.8 For the purposes of this Note, however, those laws proscribing
activity by the state are most relevant because they represent that activity
which the state has chosen as being illegitimate.8 2
74Id.
75 Id.
71 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Eco-Terror Indictments: 'Operation
Backfire' Nets 11 (Jan. 20, 2006), available at http/www.fbi.gov/page2janO6/elf012006.htm.
77 Intelligence Report, supra note 58.
71 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigations, supra note 76. Convictions stemming
from the indictments saw nine, thirteen, and twelve month prison sentences for those who
cooperated, but a potential for up to thirty years imprisonment, because of a "terrorism
enhancement" in the sentencing guidelines. William Yardley, Radical Environmentalist
Gets 9-Year Term, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
05/26/us/26sentence.html?fta=y.
79 Kirk Johnson, 4 Are Indicted on Arson Charges in 1998 Fires at a Resort in Vail, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20,2006, available at httpJ/www.nytimes.com/2006/05/20/us/20vail.html. Two
of the four indicted in Colorado had previously also been indicted, convicted and sentenced
in Oregon. See id.
' Monte Whaley, 'Eco-terrorists' Say They Torched Mansion, DENVER POST, Dec. 8 2000,
available at http://forests.org/archivelamerica/ecsaytor.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008);
Intelligence Report, supra note 58.
81 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigations, supra note 76.
82 See infra Part III for further discussion of why this is relevant.
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To be sure, then, although. Colorado is without criminal statutes
aimed specifically at ecoterror, the state has criminalized actions similar
to those offenses enumerated in Pennsylvania's ecoterror statute, includ-
ing arson,83 criminal mischief,' burglary, 5 criminal trespass,86 theft, 7
forgery, 8 and identity theft. 9 In addition to the civil remedy for the pro-
tection of agricultural products, Colorado also makes the destruction of
food product a misdemeanor crime, which appears to be the closest pro-
scribed activity to agricultural vandalism and agricultural crop destruc-
tion as enumerated in Pennsylvania's ecoterror statute.90
III. RELATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY TO ECOTERROR
Generally speaking, states have numerous justifications for crim-
inalizing certain behavior.9' Criminalizing behavior allows the state to
punish those people committing acts it deems harmful or, at the very
least, in opposition to the interests of the state.92 In so doing, the state also
seeks to deter people from committing those acts in the first place.93 The
decision to criminalize ecoterror is no different from the criminalization
of any other act. Obviously, a state such as Colorado, which has not spe-
cifically proscribed ecoterror, is not condoning ecoterror activity, especially
considering the wide berth of options it has to otherwise combat it.94 But,
a state which does specifically proscribe ecoterror, as described above, has
recognized a specific need to criminalize that behavior.95
This is all the more telling in the Pennsylvania example where
the state has proscribed, in criminalizing "ecoterror," not the acts alone,
which had already been proscribed by the state, but the acts done for a
83 COLO. REV. STAT. 18-4-101 to 18-4-105 (2002).
841d. 18-4-501.
85 Id. 18-4-201 to 18-4-205.
'6 Id. 18-4-502 to 18-4-504.87 Id. 18-4-401 to 18-4-419.
8 Id. 18-5-102, 18-5-104.
89 COLO. REV. STAT. 18-5-902 (2002).
901d. 35-31-101.
91 See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973), reprinted in WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
MODERN CRIMINAL LAW, at 1, 2 (1978) (discussing the main goals of criminal law, including
retribution, deterrence, denunciation, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).92 Id.
93 Id.
See, e.g., supra Parts II.A. & II.C.
95See, e.g., supra Part II.B.2 (Pennsylvania example).
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specific purpose. In this case, this is tantamount to the state's declaring
those identified purposes enumerated in the statute as illegitimate.96
Just as each state tailors its ecoterror criminal policy to its own
particularized interests, each state tailors its environmental policy in the
same way, also accounting for other factors such as cost and need. If crimi-
nalization could be seen as representing the state's face as to what it deems
illegitimate activity, its environmental policy could be seen as represent-
ing its face as to what it deems important in the environmental realm. To
that end, while federal environmental standards may nonetheless bene-
fit the state and dictate environmental policy within the state (just as
federal criminal law may nonetheless be used to attack ecoterror activity
within a state), the environmental policy of the state is most important in
determining how the state represents itself environmentally."
While environmental protection policy has not been seen to factor
explicitly into a state's ecoterror policy, the two are necessarily interre-
lated. Some have advocated that one way of fighting ecoterror is to focus
on environmental protection, taking the "wind out of their sails," as it
were.9" This makes intuitive sense from the perspective that having
higher levels of environmental protection makes the legitimate legislative
channels of environmental protection seem more successful.99 In an ideal
situation, this would deter ecoterror actors, many of whom have chosen
decidedly criminal courses to protect the environment because they view
lawful environmental advocacy as not doing enough. 1°'
' See Ben Saul, Three Reasons for Defining and Criminalizing Terrorism, Florence
Founding Conference Paper, European Society of International Law, 2005, at 1. The article
discusses criminalizing general terrorism in the international context, saying, "treating
terrorism as a separate category of unlawful activity expresses a deliberate desire by the
international community to morally condemn and stigmatize terrorism as an especially
egregious crime, beyond its ordinary criminal characteristics." Id.
97 See, e.g., Pa. Dept. Envtl Protection: Mission Statement, http://www.depweb.state.pa
.us/dep/cwp/view.asp?a=3&q=461254 (last visited Oct. 21,2008) ("We are responsible for
the protection of the air, land and water of the Commonwealth. We carry out our jobs in
ways that will promote measurable environmental improvement, cooperation, innovation
and sustainable development so future generations may share our wealth.").
98 See Mancuso-Smith, supra note 12, at 337-38. In the general terrorism context this has
been referred to as "mainstreaming." Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiating with Terrorists 5 (Intl
Ass'n for Conflict Mgmt., 2007 Meeting Paper, 2007), available at httpj/papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid= 1031668 ("The aim ofmainstreaming is to persuade the terror-
ists and their supporters to give up violence and pursue their goals through the existing
political system .... For mainstreaming to be successful, it is essential for the terrorists
to believe that they can achieve power by coming in from the cold, that they will be more
effective by participating in legitimate politics than by fighting the authorities.").
' See Pruitt, supra note 98, at 5.
100 Id.
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From a more theoretical perspective, a state's environmental pro-
tection and its policy combating ecoterror are intertwined. The central
tenet behind ecoterror is that the environmental protection available is
not enough, and thus those acting against the environment must be co-
erced in some other way to cease harming the environment.1"' If we think
of state environmental protection policy on a continuum, with absolutely
no environmental protection offered by the state on one end and some
kind of perfectly preservationist environmental protectionist policy on the
other, the closer a state moves towards having this ideal environmental
protection, that is, the more environmental protection the state offers, the
less reasonable the ecoterrorist's rationale for acts of destruction appears.0 2
From the state's perspective, then, the more environmental protection
offered, the less legitimate ecoterror activity becomes.0 3 In other words,
this means that if a state has criminalized ecoterror activity by signifying
that it finds the activity to be illegitimate, the state should also promul-
gate an environmental policy that justifies its position, one that offers
101 See supra Part I.B.
02 See Mancuso-Smith, supra note 12, at 338 ("Just because we may as a society disagree
with the tactics employed by the eco-saboteur, their underlying concerns over environ-
mental violations of abuse may indeed be valid."). While not identical scenarios, this is a
similar argument for the moral justification of vigilantism. See Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism
Revisited:An Economic Analysis of the Law ofExtra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Can't Dick
Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane's Truck, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1221, 1243 (1998) ("A scenario
in which established law enforcement does not exist presents the easiest case for under-
standing the rationale underlying social justification and acceptance of extra-judicial self-
help. When an established governmental system for enforcing the criminal law does not
exist, the only means available to protect Becarria's 'repository of the public well being'
is private action.").
For one article relating modern ecoterrorism to vigilantism, see American Law
and Legal Information, American Law Encyclopedia Vol. 10, Vigilantism, http://law.jrank
.org/pages/11129Nigilantism.html (last visited Oct. 21,2008), listing"environmental activ-
ists inflict[ing] economic losses on companies by obstructing lawful business activities that
they think will cause harm to the air, water, or land" as one form of modern vigilantism.
Id. See also Avi Brisman, Crime-Environment Relationships and Environmental Justice,
6 SEATrLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 727, 754-60 (2008) (discussing ecoterror as a response to "legal
harms" to the environment, in the broader social context of "environmental justice").
" See A.P. Simester & Andrew von Hirsch, Rethinking the Offense Principle, 8 LEGAL
THEORY 269, 271 (2002) (referencing Feinberg's argument for"offense as affront to sensi-
bility," the authors discuss the principle that "the more independent general usefulness
the supposedly offending conduct has, the less the claim to prohibition").
Applying this principle to the ecoterror example, a state that offers a high level
of environmental protection has made ecoterror less "useful"; to the degree that ecoterror's
end is environmental protection, the state has preempted any need (if we accept that eco-
terror hypothetically ever has a need) for such extreme environmental protectionism.
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a higher level of environmental protection. Utilizing the Pennsylvania
and Colorado examples, this means that, at the very least, Pennsylvania,
which has statutorily declared ecoterror activity illegitimate, should not
offer less environmental protection than Colorado, which has statutorily
remained silent on the issue of ecoterror.
V. COMPARING PENNSYLVANIA'S LEVEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION WITH COLORADO'S LEVEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
Because we are looking at the environmental policy each state has
taken upon itself to administer, perhaps the most telling indication of the
environmental protection afforded by a state is its administration of feder-
ally dictated environmental standards. To that end, the Environmental
Council of the States provides a comparative look at which federal envi-
ronmental programs have been delegated to the states to provide funding
and oversight.04 In delegating responsibility for federal environmental
policy, the federal government is recognizing that the states have ex-
pended resources to bring their environmental protection up to federal
standards. °5 All states have only finite resources to deal with environ-
mental protection, 0 6 so a state preempting the need for federal resources
should adequately represent a state adopting a goal of environmental pro-
tection in the same way a state criminalizing ecoterror is demonstrating
that it finds a specific activity to be illegitimate.
A. Clean Air Act
The states of Pennsylvania and Colorado both entirely run their
respective New Source Performance Standards and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants programs.' Both states also
have approved programs for meeting national standards for their
" The Environmental Council of the States, Delegation by Environmental Act, http:l!
www.ecos.org/section/states/enviroactlist (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
105 Id. The Environmental Council of the State's report provides a thorough account of
which federal programs have been delegated to each state. This report will be utilized
in providing a comparative look at the environmental protection programs in place in
Pennsylvania and Colorado.
106 Id.
107 The Environmental Council of the States, State Delegations--Clean Air Act, http:l!
www.ecos.org/section/states/enviro-actlistlstatesenviroactlist.caa (last visited Oct. 21,
2008).
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Prevention of Significant Deterioration and New Source Review pro-
grams.' Pennsylvania entirely runs its Operating Permit program,"°9 while
Colorado has an interim program, pending final EPA authorization.1 '
B. Clean Water Act
Pennsylvania maintains its program for Construction Grants,"'
as does Colorado, with the caveat that the EPA still maintains responsi-
bility for audit resolution in the Colorado program."2 Both Pennsylvania
and Colorado maintain their Nation Pollution Discharge Elimination
System programs."' Pennsylvania has not delegated or approved Pre-
treatment program, that is, it is entirely run by the EPA,"' while Colo-
rado has a program still pending delegation or approval." 5 Pennsylvania
maintains its Sludge Management program," 6 while Colorado, again, has
a program still pending delegation or approval." 7 Pennsylvania main-
tains its own State Revolving Fund, independent of EPA approval,"'
while Colorado maintains its own program as delegated by the EPA." 9
Pennsylvania has no delegated or approved Wetlands program, 2 ° while
Colorado may have a program not subject to federal delegation.' 2 '
'
8 Id.; The Environmental Council of the States, Environmental Programs Delegated to
the State-Pennsylvania [hereinafter Pennsylvania Environmental Programs], http://
www.ecos.org/section/states?id=PA (last visited Oct. 21,2008); The Environmental Council
of the States, Environmental Programs Delegated to the State-Colorado [hereinafter
Colorado Environmental Programs], http://www.ecos.org/section/states/?id=CO (last
visited Oct. 21, 2008).
109 Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
110 Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
111 The Environmental Council of the States, State Delegations-Clean Water Act, http'J/
www.ecos.org/section/states/enviro-actlist/states_enviro_actlist_cwa (last visited Feb. 28,
2009); Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
112 Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
113 Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108; Colorado Environmental
Programs, supra note 108.
114 Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
111 Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
116 Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
117 Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
11 Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
119 Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
120 Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
121 Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
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C. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
Pennsylvania maintains delegated control over all aspects of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, including the State
Cooperation, Aid and Training; Worker Protection; Endangered Species
Protection; and Groundwater Protection programs.'22 Colorado maintains
partial delegation for commercial applicators only for its State Cooperation,
Aid and Training program, as well as its Worker Protection program.'23
There has been no applicable delegation for Colorado's Endangered Species
Protection or Groundwater Protection programs. 24
D. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
As to the parts of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
Pennsylvania maintains delegated control over the RCRA's Base and Solid
Waste programs.'25 Pennsylvania has left federal control over the Corrective
Action; Mixed Waste; Burning of Hazardous Wastes in Boilers and Indus-
trial Furnaces; Toxicity Characteristic; Land Disposal Restrictions; and
Underground Storage Tank programs. 26 Colorado has been given control
over all aspects of the RCRA, except the Burning of Hazardous Wastes in
Boilers and Industrial Furnaces and the Underground Storage Tank pro-
grams, the latter of which is in the process of being delegated to the state. 27
E. Safe Drinking Water Act
Both Pennsylvania and Colorado have been delegated maintenance
of their Public Water System Supervision/Drinking Water program. 12
Both Pennsylvania and Colorado have also approved Wellhead Protection
122 The Environmental Council of the States, State Delegations-FIFRA, http'//www.ecos
.org/section/states/enviroactlist/fifra (last visited Feb. 28, 2009); Pennsylvania
Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
" Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
124 Id.
125 The Environmental Council of the States, State Delegations-RCRA, http://www.ecos
.org/section/states/enviroactlist/rcra (last visited Feb. 28, 2009); Pennsylvania
Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
126 Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
127 Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
'28 The Environmental Council of the States, State Delegations-SDWA, http'J/www.ecos
.org/section/states/enviroactlistsdwa (last visited Feb. 28, 2009); Pennsylvania Environ-
mental Programs, supra note 108; Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
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programs that are yet to be implemented. 2 9 Neither state has a delegated
or approved Underground Injection Control program. 30 The Safe Drinking
Water Act also has provisions for an optional demonstration program that
oil or natural resources meet the requirements of the Underground Injection
Control program.' 3' Pennsylvania has no such program in place,3 2 while
Colorado has been delegated maintenance of such a program.'33
F. Toxic Substances Control Act
Pennsylvania's programs under the Toxic Substances Control Act
are not subject to delegation." Colorado maintains delegated control over
the Model Accreditation Plan program for training workers to remove
asbestos from schools, as well as a delegated waiver in place under the
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act. 1' Colorado also maintains no
program subject to delegation with regards to the TSCA Indoor Radon
grant assistance program.136
G. How Do They Compare?
Comparing Pennsylvania and Colorado's adoption of federally
dictated environmental standards, the states are roughly equivalent, with
the exception of delegation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, which Pennsylvania has left largely up to federal control.'37 As dis-
cussed earlier, Pennsylvania's ecoterror statute can be viewed as most
appropriate when their level of environmental protection does not fall be-
low that of Colorado, which does not specifically criminalize ecoterror.'38
'" Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108; Colorado Environmental
Programs, supra note 108.
130 Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108; Colorado Environmental
Programs, supra note 108.
The Environmental Council of the States, State Delegations-SDWA, supra note 128.
132 Pennsylvania Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
13 Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
34The Environmental Council of the States, State Delegations-TSCA, http'J/www.ecos
.org/section/states/enviro-actlist/tsca (last visited Feb. 28, 2009); Pennsylvania,
Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
13 Colorado Environmental Programs, supra note 108.
136 id.
137 See supra Parts IV.A.-IV.F. (particularly Part IV.D.).
138 Id.
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Therefore, the states' control over federal environmental standards in this
light would generally tend to justify Pennsylvania's ecoterror statute.139
V. COMPARING PENNSYLVANIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL STATE OF
AFFAIRS WITH COLORADO'S ENVIRONMENTAL STATE OF AFFAIRS
As has been discussed previously, from a theoretical legal policy
point of view, a state's decision to criminalize ecoterror should relate to
the resources it sets forth to environmental protectionism, as both could
be seen to indicate how a state chooses to represent itself in the criminal
and environmental realms. 4 ° For similar reasons, it also makes sense to
look briefly at indicators of the environmental conditions of the respective
states. Although the environmental protection laws in place may dictate
the front end of environmental protectionism, it is also relevant to look
at how that plays out at the back end. If a state's environmental state of
affairs is poor, it may dictate that more protection should be offered by
the state to further justify its criminalization of ecoterror.
A recent state-by-state analysis placed Pennsylvania as the third
highest state in carbon dioxide emissions, with 279 million tons of carbon
dioxide emissions per year,' while Colorado ranked twenty-third, with
140 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions per year. 142 The wide gap is
largely explained by Pennsylvania's larger population. With the sixth
highest resident population in the country, Pennsylvania was respon-
sible for 22.1 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per person, ranking as the
twenty-third highest state per capita."4 Colorado, with the twenty-fourth
highest resident population, was responsible for the slightly less 20.86
tons of carbon dioxide emissions per person, ranking as the twenty-fourth
highest state per capita."M Despite being on approximately equal footing
139 Id.
14 See supra Part IV.
141 Pennsylvania Energy Consumption Information, http://www.eredux.com/states/state
_detail.php?id=1116 (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
42 Colorado Energy Consumption Information, http'//www.eredux.com/states/statedetail
.php?id=1134#eis (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
14 Pennsylvania Energy Consumption Information, supra note 141. Pennsylvania also
hosts heavy energy-consuming industry "including aluminum, chemical manufacturing,
forest products, glass making, petroleum refining, and steel" which accounts for its high
carbon output. Id. This is in contrast with Colorado, where much of the energy consump-
tion is from the transportation and residential sectors, rather than its economy. Colorado
Energy Consumption Information, supra note 142.
'44 Colorado Energy Consumption Information, supra note 142.
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in terms of per capita carbon emissions, Pennsylvania's "carbon footprint"
is still double that of Colorado,14 and an argument could be made that, as
a result, Pennsylvania has a higher duty to environmental protectionism.
Pennsylvania's carbon dioxide output is especially notable in light of the
renewable energy alternative potential within the state, including hydro-
power from the Susquehanna River and the high wind power potential off
its mountain ranges and on the Lake Erie shoreline.146
VI. How SHOULD EACH STATE'S RESPECTIVE LEVEL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INFORM ITS ECOTERROR POLICY?
Harsher ecoterror laws that specifically target ecoterror seem
most appropriate when they coincide with a high level of state environ-
mental protection.147 This sends the message that the state seeks envi-
ronmental protection, and appreciates its role as environmental protector,
thus advocating a legitimate means towards that end. Although a state
has every interest in curbing what it deems criminal activity, when it
carves out a special rule against criminal actors seeking to protect the
environment without offering much in the way of environmental protec-
tion itself, there is a degree to which this can be seen as the state safe-
guarding environmental actors, rather than safeguarding environmental
concerns and its own role as a legitimate environmental protector.
The lawmakers who aided in getting Pennsylvania's ecoterror
statute passed into law cited a concern for discouragement of industry
that would have an effect on the state's economic interests,"4 which have
been shown to contribute heavily to Pennsylvania's stature as having
some of the highest carbon dioxide emissions in the country.149 Although
Pennsylvania's environmental protection laws are on the same approxi-
mate level with those of Colorado, there still appears to be much more the
state could be doing.150 Of course, these are rough estimates, produced
4 Pennsylvania Energy Consumption Information, supra note 141.
146 Id.
141 See supra Part III.
" See supra Part II.B.2.
149 See supra note 141.
" See Brian Wingfield & Miriam Marcus, America's Greenest States, FORBES.cOM, Oct. 17,
2007, available at httpY/www.forbes.com/business/2007/10/16/environment-energy-vermont-
biz-beltway-cx bw mm 1017greenstates.html (ranking Pennsylvania thirty-second on a
list of "greenest" states, which included analysis of factors like policy initiatives and energy
consumption). Colorado ranked thirteenth on the list. Id.
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from a cursory look at the environmental protection each state offers,
and surely a more in depth look might yield different results. But in spe-
cifically deciding to criminalize ecoterror, Pennsylvania has made a bold
statement: intimidation of those interests having an impact on the envi-
ronment is not to be tolerated within the state.' 5 ' This statement might
have even more resonance if the state was doing more itself in the name
of environmental protection.
CONCLUSION
The contemporary global landscape has made terrorism a central
focus of discussion, for better or worse, and if anything has become clear,
it is that there are no easy answers for dealing with it. Regardless of
how one feels about the labeling of extremist environmental activity as
"ecoterror," it seems clear there are no easy answers for dealing with it
as well. The recent fires set to a so-called "green" development provide one
particularly salient example of the frustration in combating ecoterror.'52
Developers were doing what they thought was right for the environment,
but nevertheless found themselves the victims of what appeared to be an
ecoterror attack by members of the ELF.'53 As has been discussed, those
who commit acts of ecoterror ultimately do so because they are unhappy
with the mainstream environmental movement. 5 1 It stands to reason
that ecoterror's demands-the total elimination of human impact on the
environment15-are unreasonable. Thus, they will not be happy with any
environmental progress. This says that, ultimately, it is not entirely clear
if states providing greater environmental protection will eliminate the
threat of ecoterror. But the fact that "mainstreaming" will not work in
every case does not mean it is completely ineffective. 5 ' Creating an
... For a similar conclusion with regards to international terrorism, see Saul, supra note
9, at 12 ("Criminalization is a powerful symbolic mechanism for delineating internationally
unacceptable behaviour, irrespective of whether deterrence of ideologically motivated
offenders is feasible.").
152 Yardley, supra note 1.
"5 Id. Although the article describes the hesitation of authorities to attribute the attack
definitively to the ELF, as was discussed above, the ELF is not hesitant to take respon-
sibility for any acts of destruction done in its name, as it considers itself more an ethos
than an organization. See supra Part I.B.1
" See supra Part I.B.
155 Id.
1
" See Pruitt, supra note 98, at 5 ("The most one can usually hope for with the mainstream-
ing strategy is to persuade enough former terrorists to become involved in the politics that
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administrative climate where environmental protection is offered may
have beneficial effects, not only on the environment, but in suggesting
that mainstream environmentalism is not ineffective. Acts of ecoterror
are crimes that, no matter which way they are looked at, will invariably
do more harm than good. Therefore, states have every right to combat
them as they see fit. The Vail attack prosecutions are an example of com-
bating ecoterror with existing criminal statutes, albeit federal ones. 5 v
Pennsylvania, though yet to utilize it, has established a specific statute
aimed at combating ecoterror. 5 Only time will tell if and how states will
use these tools in conjunction with their power to dictate environmental
policy to combat ecoterror and whether those efforts will be successful.
the other terrorists become isolated and stop fighting."); see also supra note 151 (positing
that the statement criminalization makes is more important than deterrence).
.
57 See supra Part II.C.
1 8 See supra Part I.B.2.
20091 603
